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Abstract  
This thesis implements the static EBIT-Based structural model proposed by Goldstein, Ju, & 
Leland (2001) to compute the default probabilities of 17 firms from the automotive industry. 
Following other papers (e.g. Eisdorfer, Goyal, & Zhdanov (2019)), this thesis also adapts our base 
model for the possibility of non-financial fixed costs, which are proxied by SG&A. The before 
mentioned models are calibrated using the Vassalou and Xing (2004) iterative approach, first used 
to calibrate the Merton (1974) model. The algorithm was adapted for the case with corporate 
payouts. Using a sample period of 12 years, this thesis shows how the default probabilities fluctuate 
across time in different geographies. The static Goldstein, Ju, & Leland (2001) leads to an average 
5-year default probability of 2.38%. In contrast, the newly prosed model with fixed costs proxied 
by SG&A leads to an average 5-year default probability of 15.46%. Comparing these results with 
credit rating implied default probabilities of 3.42% shows that the later model’s estimates are high. 
This thesis concludes that, though widely used in the literature, the use of SG&A as a proxy for 
fixed costs leads to seemingly unreasonable high default probabilities. Its use as a proxy for fixed 
non-financial costs is thus questionable.   
 
Resumo 
Esta tese implementa o modelo estrutural proposto por Goldstein, Ju, & Leland (2001) (versão 
estática), o qual é baseado no resultado operacional da empresa, para calcular as probabilidades de 
incumprimento de 17 empresas da indústria automóvel. Seguindo outros artigos (ex. Eisdorfer, 
Goyal, & Zhdanov (2019)), esta tese também adapta este modelo para a possibilidade de custos 
fixos não financeiros, que são aproximados pelos custos gerais e administrativos (ou SG&A). Os 
modelos acima mencionados são calibrados utilizando a abordagem iterativa de Vassalou e Xing 
(2004), a qual foi desenvolvida com vista a calibrar o modelo de Merton (1974). O algoritmo foi 
adaptado para aos stakeholders. Utilizando um período amostral de 12 anos, esta tese mostra como 
as probabilidades de incumprimento variam ao longo do tempo em diferentes geografias. A versão 
estática do modelo de Goldstein, Ju, & Leland (2001) conduz a uma probabilidade de 
incumprimento média de 5 anos de 2.38%. Em contraste, o novo modelo proposto com custos fixos 
aproximados pelos custos gerais e administrativos conduz a uma probabilidade média de 
incumprimento a 5 anos de 15.46%. A comparação destes resultados com as probabilidades de 
incumprimento implícitas nos ratings de risco de crédito, cuja média é 3.42%, mostram que as 
estimativas do segundo modelo são elevadas. Esta tese conclui que, embora os custos gerais e 
administrativos sejam amplamente utilizados na literatura como proxy para os custos fixos das 
empresas, a sua utilização conduz a probabilidades de incumprimento aparentemente elevadas e 
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In recent years, there has been an increased interest in credit risk and default probabilities across 
practitioners and academics. There are a variety of credit risk models with different levels of 
complexity that can tackle this issue. The most basic models use financial ratios to give credit 
ratings to different companies. This is the case of the Altman Z-score and the Ohlson O-score 
model, which are often used by practitioners in their investment decision making process. These 
approaches are not able however to differentiate between each company’s stand-alone probability 
of default. In addition, statistical inferences are also harder to make based on these metrics. Starting 
with Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) seminal papers, these authors came up with a 
new alternative approach to compute default probabilities: the structural approach. The Black-
Scholes-Merton structural model distinguishes itself from previous models by establishing a clear 
link between fundamentals and default. In addition, the fact that the model can be calibrated using 
forward looking market data is considered to improve the model’s forecasting performance. The 
Black & Scholes (1973) framework, which is at the core of the Merton (1974) model was highly 
regarded and used in option pricing by practitioners with full trust. As it started to get tested in the 
real markets, several critiques started to arise and researchers started to propose alternatives to the 
model that relax some of its initial assumptions to reflect real market behavior. The same occurs 
with its application to credit risk, which has led to a large number of subsequent papers relaxing 
some of Black-Scholes-Merton initial less realistic assumptions and proposing better estimation 
methods. Recent papers are able to address most of the problems of the initial approach. This often 
comes however at the expense of closed form solutions or a higher number of parameters that need 
to be estimated. Although proposed models thereafter use different estimation methods, the default 
barrier has been a point of contention in the literature because the Merton (1974) model proposes 
a rather stringent and less realistic approach to set it. Since this is a focal point of any credit risk 
model, there are several attempts to estimate this endogenously or exogenously, aiming to improve 
the Merton (1974) model.  
 This dissertation will use the static version of the Goldstein, Ju & Leland (2001) EBIT-
based structural model to estimate the default probability of firms belonging to the automotive 
industry. The automotive industry, being one of the leading sources of employment, has seen 
serious drops in value during the financial crisis affecting their credit rating. Ultimately, the 




default on their debt.  This is an industry with players who are too big to fail and it would therefore 
be interesting to see whether their credit riskiness was significantly affected during the periods 
were all industries saw their probabilities of default increase. I will use a sample of seventeen (17) 
companies across different geographies to compare how their probabilities of default fluctuates 








2.0 Literary review 
Credit risk is defined as the risk of incurring a loss as a result of a counterparty failing to 
make a payment on time.  This is usually split up into two metrics. The probability of default gives 
an idea on how likely this loss is to occur. The loss given default measures the magnitude of the 
loss when the counterparty fails to make the payment. Typically, because of the way that debt 
contracts are structured, the probability of default on any given claim is the same, but the amount 
recovered given default differs by claimant depending on the terms of the contract. Although debt 
holders can diversify this risk in a portfolio, this paper will focus on standalone risk, and measuring 
default probability in particular because “[nothing is] more important or more difficult to 
determine” (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003).  There is extensive literature about how to model these metrics 
using different modelling approaches. This includes Altman Z-scores, probit/logit models, machine 
learning models, intensity based models, and structural models. The literature review will go over 
the strengths and weaknesses of some of these models with a particular focus on the structural 
models.  
 Default is when a company can’t pay for its commitments on time. Before reaching this 
situation, it’s very difficult to identify which companies will or will not default. This is because 
there are various legislative and financial parameters that can affect the outcome of a company that 
is under distress. To tackle this problem we have to find the likelihood of this event happening. As 
Crosbie & Bohn (2003) agree, coming up with a specific number to measure this is tricky because 
default events are very rare (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003).  
 Initially these models used to be “expert systems and subjective analysis” but have moved 
towards being more objective based systems. A simple and objective way to model credit risk is 
by using credit-scoring models. These models will take key accounting variables and combine them 
to produce a credit risk score. This is then compared with a benchmark to understand the credit 
worthiness of that firm. Within this category of credit risk models there are four distinct and 
dominant methodologies identified by Altman and Saunders (1996). These are linear probability 
models, logit models, probit models, and discriminant analysis models. Discriminant analysis 
models use accounting and market variables to find a linear function that best differentiates 
between two borrower categories, repayment and non-repayment. This implies the maximization 
of the inter-category variance, and minimizing the intra-category variance (Altman & Saunders, 




This is a private firm model based on the Altman (1968), five variable discriminant analysis model 
(Altman, 1968).  Logit models use accounting variables to assign a probability of default to a firm, 
while assuming that probabilities of default are distributed logistically. Martin (1977) compared 
these two methods to predict the failure of banks between 1975-1976. His work shows that both 
methodologies came up with similar results.  
 Although these models have been proven to perform well when modeling credit risk, 
Altman and Saunders (1996) identify three criticisms of accounting based credit-scoring models. 
The first limitation is that these models are based on book value data, and will therefore be limited 
in capturing the subtle changes in a dynamic borrower’s live situation. The second limitation is that 
the real world conditions are rarely linear, and therefore linear probability assumptions and/or 
linear discriminant analysis will have a difficulty in accurately modeling credit risk. The third 
limitation is that some of these models are loosely linked to a theoretical model (Altman & 
Saunders, 1996).  Nonetheless, more advanced models have been developed to model credit risk.  
A more complex way to model risk is to come up with implied probabilities of default using 
the term structure of yield spreads between risky and riskless companies. This is a method to derive 
market expectations but is also subject to noteworthy assumptions that are considered questionable 
by Altman and Saunders (1996). These assumptions are that the expectation theory holds, 
transaction costs are insignificant, and that option features are absent. Another way to model credit 
risk is the mortality-default rate models. These models use data on past defaults by credit grade 
and years to maturity. This is a method that is highly popular amongst credit rating agencies. 
Although appealing, extending this mortality rate method is limited because data on loan default is 
very small. Robert Morris Associates, is trying to consolidate the sparse private data from banks to 
have a database that can be used for this purpose (Roberts et. al, 2008). Finally, another way to 
model risk is to use the “risk of ruin” model. These models assume that a firm goes bankrupt when 
its asset value falls below its obligations to debt holders. Given this assumption, the methodology 
to model this event occurring can come in the shape of an option pricing model.  
When looking at the probability of default metric, Crosbie (2003) splits the case up into 
three elements: Value of assets, Asset risk, and Leverage. The definition of the value of assets is 
given as the “market value of the firm’s assets”. The asset risk is defined as the uncertainty of the 
asset value in the future. Leverage is the relationship between the asset value and the amount of 




to measure these elements, the important thing to note is that the only element truly observable on 
the market is the leverage. Credit risk models are the tools used to bypass this limitation going from 
key assumptions and using market data to come up with a specific way to measure probability of 
defaults and losses given default.    
 In practice the firm’s probability of default will increase as its asset value gets closer to the 
book value of its liabilities. This can be replicated across industries. The question that researchers 
have been trying to answer effectively is at which point default actually occurs. Crosbie (2003) 
shows that the default point generally lies between the total liabilities value and the current short 
term liabilities (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003). Measuring this probability has been the motivation of 
several models in both academic and private institutions, this includes the Black-Scholes-Merton 
model.  
2.1 The Black-Scholes-Merton Framework  
 In order to understand the breakthrough of the Merton Model (1974) in measuring credit 
risk, their methodology will be analyzed using available literature. As discussed earlier, liabilities 
are the financial claims that need to be serviced by the company, at a specific date, in order to avoid 
default.  Structural models are attractive when modeling contingent liabilities because they “link 
valuation of financial claims to economic fundamentals” (Andersen & Sundaresan, 2000). The 
work that has been done previously in the field of corporate liabilities all point towards the fact 
that the corporate liabilities are highly correlated with the “stock market returns and 
macroeconomic indicators” (Andersen & Sundaresan, 2000). As a result, simple structural models 
have been historically the preferred approach for practitioners to evaluate risky companies 
(Andersen & Sundaresan, 2000).    
The Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton models (1974) were the first models to 
effectively use “parsimonious specifications to derive major insights about the determinants of 
credit spreads” (Andersen & Sundaresan, 2000). Since all subsequent structural models are a 
development of the Black and Scholes (1973), it’s a good starting point for the discussion. Black 
& Scholes is an option pricing model that is used to price derivatives. This framework takes into 
consideration that an option can be priced using the volatility, strike price, and current price of an 
underlying asset. Using this framework and applying it to credit risk measurement, default isn’t 
only about the market value of the company’s assets, but also the volatility of the market of value 




will behave as a European option. This implies that the firm will only default at the end of the 
period. In addition, the model also assumes that the defaults are normally distributed and that risk-
free rate is constant throughout the term.  The Merton (1974) model works under this setting with 
a couple key assumptions. The model considers that equity holders have a call option on the firm’s 
assets. This means that if the asset value is above a certain point they will exercise their call option, 
and earn the difference, otherwise, they will not exercise their option and will therefore receive 
nothing. Hence, a default event is the same as not exercising the call option. This is the basis for 
calculating the probability of default, recovery rate, and loss given default using the Black & 
Scholes framework (Sundaresan, 2013).   
Critiques of this model are mostly geared towards how realistic its assumptions are. 
Assuming that there is one class of debt, no coupon payments, and all debt matures at a single point 
in time is very unrealistic. In addition, asset value isn’t observable and therefore this makes it 
difficult to find the strike price of the implied call option held by equity holders. This strike price 
can be referred to as the default barrier. This is a point of debate amongst academics as it has a 
strong impact on measuring credit risk and default probabilities (Kealhofer & Kurbat, 2002). The 
following will be a discussion of the subsequent models and how they differ in their estimation of 
the default boundary.  
2.2 Developments to the Merton (1974) Model 
Even though the basic idea behind structural models is the same, their implicit assumptions 
can differ largely. In some structural models, asset volatility is considered as a proxy to asset risk. 
Asset volatility is the “standard deviation of the annual percentage change in the asset value”.  As 
Crosbie (2003) discusses equity volatility and asset volatility, he notes that there is a clear 
distinction between the two. Although, the magnitude of the volatility differs between industries, 
the size of leverage can also have an amplifying effect on the volatility. By looking at the 
relationship between asset volatility and equity volatility, and assuming that the distribution of 
default is known, a distance to default metric can be inferred. This is a parameter that measures 
how many standard deviations the company is away from default, assuming a normal distribution. 
This measure is of great use because it’s able to capture macroeconomic and firm-specific 
uncertainties into one value. Theoretically speaking this is a basic way to understand the likelihood 




analyze different attempts to do this using structural models, an approach that has been providing 
reliable results for long-term probabilities of default.    
The Black-Scholes-Merton framework initial assumptions have been relaxed in a number 
of ways. Merton set the default threshold equal to the book value of liabilities. This is a 
straightforward approach but there is little empirical evidence that nominal liabilities is the best 
estimate of the default threshold. An alternative is to assume that this barrier is exogenous to the 
model. This must be then estimated. This can be done on a firm level basis or based on a large 
number of firms. For example, Moody’s set it as a function of short term and long term debt. An 
alternative way to estimate the barrier exogenously is to define it within the model (endogenous 
barrier). One model that does this is the Leland model. Such models assume that there is a point 
where equity holders will decide to default. In the literature, this decision is discussed as the default 
trigger. This point is estimated in the Leland model invoking the smooth-pasting condition derived 
by Dixit (1991) for “the optimal regulation of Brownian motion” (Leland, 1994).  Other 
endogenous models find this trigger by deriving an asset value at which the shareholders will 
maximize their wealth if they don’t pay the debt. This includes events of strategic defaults to get 
better terms from creditors, which occurs often in practice (Elizalde, 2012). These models assume 
that shareholders can inject capital in the firm. Some endogenous models assume however that 
shareholders can’t do this due to market frictions. In these cases, default occurs due to a liquidity 
crisis rather than a value driven event (Kim et. Al,  1993). 
Black & Cox (1976) takes the Merton (1974) model further to address some of the shortfalls 
primarily by changing the way debt is calculated. The Merton (1974) model assumes that the 
default event occurs at maturity and not at any time in between, although in reality, default can 
occur in between. In the Black & Cox (1976) model, the equity is now considered a down-and-out 
option, and this is justified by safety covenants that make the default time unknown ex-ante. They 
include an endogenous default barrier used to value the coupon paying debt instruments (Black & 
Cox, 1976). By making the barrier endogenous they are able to model scenarios where default 
occurs before maturity of the debt (Sundaresan, 2013).  This is referred to as a first-passage-time 
model. The resulting default barrier in this model is only dependent on the size of the coupon 
payments on the debt and the asset volatility. On the other hand, this is also contingent on the 
assumption that interest rates are constant. Another contribution to the Black & Scholes framework 




taxes and developed an endogenous barrier to the Merton (1974) model. An endogenously 
estimated barrier gives the opportunity to model the default event as the decision of the shareholder 
to maximize their wealth.   
Afik & Arad (2016) discuss other ways the Merton model was adapted by practitioners to 
estimate the default barriers. One commercial application is the KMV model used by Moody’s. 
They adapted the original Merton model to agency ratings. The KMV-Merton model recognizes 
that neither the volatility nor the asset value of the company is observable. Therefore, the model 
assumes that both can be inferred through the value of equity, volatility of equity, and other 
variables by solving two nonlinear equations. After these values are inferred, the model assigns a 
probability of default as a z-score of a normal cumulative density function. By doing so, they’re 
able to calculate an implied default barrier and distance to default.  
 In addition to the default barrier being a point of contention, the Merton (1974) model is 
also criticized for the asset tradability assumption. This assumption makes sense for stocks that are 
constantly traded on liquid markets. This is less the case when the underlying isn’t traded because 
the market isn’t complete. To address this issue, some structural models treat assets as a fictive 
security that generates a payout. This can be found in Goldstein, Ju, and Leland EBIT based model. 
By linking the assets to the fundamentals of the company, the model behaves more realistically. In 
particular, Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) argue that the traditional Merton (1974) model can 
overestimate the risk-neutral drift of the diffusion process. This in turn would make the probability 
of bankruptcy lower than what it is. In this regard, the GJL model aims to correct this by 
implementing a payout ratio that includes the payouts made to corporate claimants, which in their 
case includes the government via taxes. Through this, they show empirically that their model’s risk 
neutral drift is lower than the Merton (1974) model and thus their model predicts higher 
probabilities of default.   
An additional point of contention raised by Eisdorfer, Goyal and Zhdanov (2019) is whether 
pricing default options using structural equity valuation models is correct. Similar to Goldstein, Ju, 
and Leland (2001), they consider the firm as fictive security that generates a payout and requires 
fixed costs. Since cash flow information isn’t available they opt for gross margin as a proxy for the 
payout, and fixed costs are also considered as a claimant similar to interest. They also subtract 
depreciation and Capex when computing the free cash flows. In this model the barrier is 




even without leverage, servicing the fixed costs of the security is more relevant to a firm than 
interest. They’re able to show that a strategy that shorts overpriced default options, and goes long 
on underpriced options generates an 11% alpha. This means that their approach to modeling default 
and calibrating the barrier shows signs of mispricing of default using structural equity valuation 
models.    
2.3 Structural Model Performance  
The Merton (1974) is relatively popular and has been subject to extensive empirical 
evaluations. Hilligeist et al. (2004) compared the Merton (1974) model to the Altman (1968) and 
Ohlson (1980) models and confirmed that the Merton (1974) model outperforms them in terms of 
power to predict default. Alternatively, Campbell et. al (2008) also found that by combining the 
Merton model default probability with other variables that are relevant to a company’s default, they 
have little contribution towards the predictive power of the resulting hazard model (Afik, Arad, & 
Galil, 2016).  
Reisz & Perlich (2007) are more critical about the prediction of default using the down-
and-out option. Most existing attempts quote a 1, 3, or, 5 year span for their estimation of default 
probability based on an option with equivalent lifespan. The strike price is calculated differently, 
depending on the model. The biggest limitation here is that the model implicitly assumes the whole 
debt structure to mature in that time span and the life of a company is also assumed to have that 
same time span. In evaluating the default probability empirically, they also argue that the accuracy 
of a model is a poor measure because using a binary hit or miss methodology ignores the default 
probabilities that are positive but below the threshold to qualify as a hit. Accuracy also doesn’t 
account for the continuous nature of the decision process that a loan officer goes through. The loan 
officer has more too loose if a failing company continues to lose money rather than not granting a 
loan to a successful company. Stein (2002) proposes a different approach. He looks at 
discriminatory power and calibration. The first criterion looks at how well a model is able to rank 
the firms that are more likely to default than survive. The calibration criteria looks at whether the 
probabilities predicted here correspond to actual default frequencies (Reisz & Perlich, 2007). In 
their attempt to estimate the bankruptcy probabilities of a sample of 5784 companies, they use 
equity prices to imply their market value, volatility of their assets, and the firm-specific default 




firm's market value of assets and that it increases with leverage and decreases with asset volatility. 
In addition, their specification outperforms the Black-Scholes model and the KMV models 
described earlier. However, the Altman Z-score outperforms all models in the 1 year time-frame 
(Reisz & Perlich, 2007).  
The KMV model has also been evaluated empirically. Keanan & Stein (2000) concluded 
their evaluation by being critical of the accuracy of the model. On the other hand, Kealhofer & 
Kurbat (2002) disagree and show that the Moody KMV model is able to capture agency ratings 
and other accounting ratios in their assessment (Keanan, 2000). The critique of the KMV model 
develops further in Bharath & Shumway (2004) work, as they find that the KMV-Merton model 
doesn’t produce a strong enough statistic for the probability of default. Furthermore they conclude 
that a stronger statistics can be computed without having to solve the KMV-Merton simultaneous 
nonlinear equations (Bharath, 2004). In response to this critique, Moody’s also propose a 
proprietary hybrid model. Sobehart, Stein, Mikityanskaya, and Li (2000) evaluate the performance 
of this model through a combination of distance-to-default from structural models, and other credit 
rating and accounting based variables. Their results show that there is no structural model of a 
financial metric that captures all the variables that go into the assessment of the true credit 
worthiness of a company, and therefore, it’s acceptable to use a hybrid model of both (Sobehart, 
Keenan, & Stein, 2000).  Structural models behave much better than other models in predicting 
company default. On the other hand they don’t capture all the information necessary and therefore, 
using Altman’s Z-score or Ohlson’s O-score to add incremental information to the analysis gives 




3.0 The Model  
 This section is divided into two parts. First, the EBIT-based model of Goldstein, Ju and 
Leland (2001) is presented in depth. The second part discusses adding fixed costs to the model 
following Eisdorfer, Goyal and Zhdanov (2019).  
3.1 EBIT-Based Model (GJL 2001) 
 The structured model at the core of this dissertation is the EBIT-Based model proposed by 
Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001). Their model stems from the special case payout flow of Goldstein 
and Zapatero (1996). In this model, it is considered that a firm holds a project whose EBIT 
dynamics are given by the following equation under the physical measure P,  
(1) 
where μp and σ are constants. The value of this project can be computed by discounting all future 
EBIT at a certain constant discount rate. More importantly, the value of the project can be 
discounted using the risk free rate under the risk neutral measure, 
 
  (2), 
where μ = (μp - θσ). In this case, θ is the risk-premium. The denominator of equation (2) is the 
difference between μp and the product of the market risk-premium and volatility. This is the payout 
flow rate of the risk-neutral drift from equation (1) where μp= μ. From the application of Ito’s lemma 








Furthermore, GJL consider k representing the asset project payout ratio (k= 𝛿t/V). 
Substituting the asset value function and cancelling the deltas one obtains: 
(4) 
This is equivalent to saying that μ = r-k. By setting k to the payout ratio, GJL show that the 
dynamics of V can be written as follows by replacing μ in equation (3): 
(5)  
It is further assumed that at its inception the firm issues a perpetual bond with coupon 
payment C. The firm is not allowed to issue further debt until its liquidation1. It is further assumed 
that the firm is liquidated whenever the project value reaches a certain level from above. This level 
is called the default barrier and defined as VB. The fact that C is constant turns all claims time-
independent. In this case.  
It is possible to show that under this setting the pricing of any claim on this project is given 
by the solution to the following second order ordinary differential equation: 
  (6) 
P in this equation is the payout flow of the project. Furthermore, the general solution can 
be shown as: 
   (7) 
Where x and y are the following.   
(8) 
In this set-up A1 and A2 are both constants, x is positive, and y is negative. The value of A1 
and A2 depends on the specific claim. In their paper, GJL (2001) start by finding the price of a 





security that pays a dollar contingent on the project value reaching VB. They denominate this by 
PB(V). This gives us the boundary conditions for PB(V) as:  
 
The value of this dollar paying security can be found using the general solution mentioned 
above, simplified her to:  
(9) 
Considering the boundary conditions, A1 and A2 simplify this function to give us:  
(10) 
GJL (2001) start by finding the price of this security because it is a useful building block to 
derive the price of perpetual debt and, ultimately, equity. 
When the firm is solvent, the value of equity can also be derived using the general solution 
discussed earlier. In this case, GJL assume that a company’s payouts 𝛿 has three claimants, equity, 
government and debt. The sum of these claims would be defined as:  
(11) 
There are several claimants to a company’s value. This includes debt holders, 
shareholders, government, and distress costs. Each claimant gets his share of the revenues under 
different conditions, contingent on the size of its revenue and whether it is solvent or not.  When 
the company is solvent, V will be greater than VB. This means that A1 equals zero and if V is equal 
to VB then there is nothing for the claimant to claim. These constraints can simplify equation (11) 
to the following:  
(12) 
Similarly, interest payments can also be modeled to the following equation considering that 
as V remains greater than VB, A1 = 0 and when V= VB the claim disappears.  
(13) 
Splitting up the firm’s value (Vsolv) across the three claimant defined earlier, namely 







GJL take equation 14 further and show that it can be re-written under the risk neutral 
expectation using the theorem of Feynman and Kac. By doing so and applying this to equation (11) 
they find that equity claim on the firm’s value under the risk neutral measure can be written as the 
following:  
 (18) 
The T in this equation represents the random time of bankruptcy. What this implies is that 
after the coupon payment is made, the claims on the assets are split between the government and 
the equity holders based on the effective tax rate in place.  
According to the GJL (2001) there is an optimal default level that will maximize equity 
wealth given limited liability. In their paper, they use the following smooth pasting conditions. 
 
The solution to that is the following optimal default level.  
 (19)   where   (20) 
 The probability of default in this model is computed by trying to estimate the survivorship 
likelihood over the sample period selected. Similar to the structural model setting of the MM 
algorithm proposed by Forte & Lovreta. Equation (21), this model will consolidate estimated 
parameters from the model into a single value that can be used to understand the likelihood of 







By subtracting 1 from the result of the above equation, the estimate of the probability of 
default is computed based on the estimates of σ and μv.  
3.2 Introducing Fixed Costs to the GJL EBIT-Model 
 The dissertation will introduce fixed costs to the GJL model in order to understand better 
how a company’s probability of default changes when considering operational and financial 
leverage instead of just financial leverage. The general solution for the equity value using the GJL 
model shows that we subtract the coupon payments “C” in order to find the claim that each of three 
stakeholders have on the project value . The coupon identified and incorporated by GJL are interest 
payments. The coupon reduces the payout of the project in this framework prior to distributing it 
to the claimants accordingly. Fixed costs are also a constant payment made by the project and not 
claimed by any of the claimants mentioned earlier. In this case fixed costs could be considered as 
an additional claimant. This can be demonstrated through a balance sheet where the present value 
of a project is on the left side and claimants are on the right side. When adding the fixed costs to 
the EBIT, it affects the left side of the balance sheet, and consequently, to balance this out on the 
right side, fixed costs are considered as an additional claimant. Since fixed costs behave as such, 
this will affect the value of the company left to cover its debt obligations. Depending on the size 
of the fixed costs, there is a possibility that it will affect the probability of default of that company 
differently. This implies two significant changes that need to be made to the model in order to 
reflect this assumption and compare both results to understand how a companies fixed costs affect 
its survivorship.  The first change is that the new claimant here will have a payout equal the fixed 
costs of the company called FC. What this implies in the model is that VFC will now contain the 





 This affects the value of all three claimants identified by the model since this can only 
reduce the value of the sum of their claims. In addition to this, the fixed cost also implies that the 
barrier is now different as well. Since the smooth pasting condition allows us to write down the 
default barrier as,  
 (24) 
and the C includes fixed costs, the barrier will go up as long as fixed costs are positive. This 
dynamic is interesting because the model not only accounts for financial leverage and its effect on 
the possibility of default, but also considers the fixed costs. In this case, fixed costs will represent 
the operational leverage of the company and could give a better idea about their realistic likelihood 








4.0 Model Calibration  
This section discusses how the iterative approach proposed by Vassalou and Xing (2004) 
for the Merton (1974) model can be used to calibrate the static version of the GJL model presented 
in section 3.1 and its fixed costs extension presented in section 3.2. In addition, this section 
discusses how the market price of risk and the expected return on the project can be estimated 
based on the CAPM.         
4.1 The asset value and asset return volatility  
The methodology chosen in this dissertation to calibrate the models proposed in section 3 
is based on the iterative approach applied by Vassalou and Xing (2004). In the case of the Merton 
(1974) model, as the market value of equity does not depend on the expected return on the firm 
assets, under the iterative approach, we have only one parameter to estimate: σv. Based on the 
estimated σv it is possible to recover the latent asset value from a time series of equity prices. Their 
iterative approach follows five steps:    
Step 1:  Assume a tolerance level for convergence of the volatility variable  
Step 2:  Set an initial guess for asset volatility. Historical equity return volatility was 
used as the initial guess for asset return volatility.  
Step 3:  Infer a time series of asset values using the observed equity and the model 
value of equity.   
Equity Observed – Equity Estimated (σv) = 0  
Step 4:  Compute the standard deviation of the asset returns of the newly inferred 
time series of asset values. 
Step 5:  Repeat the procedure with the newly computed volatility until the value of 
two consecutive iterations converges under the tolerance level assumed in 
step 1.    
The estimated volatility can then be used to find the asset value of the company. The model 
used in this dissertation has an additional variable “k” to estimate. Based on the model assumptions, 
k is a fixed constant, which links the EBIT (or EBIT+SG&A in section 3.2 model) to the project 
value. In particular Asset = EBIT/k (section 3.1) or Asset = (EBIT+SG&A)/k (section 3.2). The 




however, the project value is estimated as if it was an exogenous state variable meaning that the 
link between EBIT (or EBIT+SG&A) and k is broken. This is equivalent to saying that the true 
EBIT (EBIT+SG&A) that matters for the model is not exactly the one that is observed in the firm’s 
books but the one that can be extracted from the estimated project value multiplied by the estimated 
k. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to think that, on average, we still have k=EBIT/Asset or 
equivalently k = (EBIT+SG&A)/Asset. Following this idea k can also be estimated iteratively with 
the help of accounting data on EBIT and SG&A. The iterative procedure used to calibrate σv and k 
was the following:  
Step 1:  Assume the same tolerance level as the volatility. 
Step 2:  Set an initial value for k. 20% was chosen for the initial guess.   
Step 3:  Apply the Vassalou and Xing (2004) with the pricing equation presented in 
sections 3.1 and 3.2. Obtain an estimate for sigma.  
Step 4:  Compute the k as the ratio of the mean of EBIT over the mean of the newly 
recovered asset vector (model section 3.1) or as the ratio of the mean of EBIT 
plus SG&A over the mean of the newly recovered asset vector (model 
section 3.2). 
Step 5:  Repeat the procedure until two consecutive estimates of k fall under the 
tolerance level in step 1.  
After estimating k and σv, the pricing equations are used to recover the asset value of the 
company.  
4.2 The market price of risk  
In order to compute the model probability of default under measure P, one needs to estimate 
the market price of risk. This dissertation will make the calculation under the CAPM assumptions. 
The CAPM determines that the expected return on any asset i to be:  
ri= rf  + βi (E(Rm)- rf ) (24)  , 
where βi is a measure of the systematic risk of the asset and E(Rm) is the expected return of the 
selected market portfolio proxy of each company’s domicile country. In particular, based on the 
CAPM, the expected return on equity can be written as 





In parallel, it can be shown that the expected return on equity under section 3.1 and 3.2 
models is given by  
μe = r+θ* σe (26), 
where theta is the market price of risk, or the return demanded for each unit of volatility of the 
portfolio.  
Using equation 25 and 26 together, theta can be re-written as  
θ = β*ERP/σe (27). 






5.0 Data  
This section introduces the data used to run the model and checks how far the data is from 
the models assumptions. The dataset selected covers financial and accounting variables of 
seventeen companies from the automotive industry over the period of 31/12/2004 - 30/12/2016. 
Both the accounting and financial data has been pulled from Datastream. Due to different 
accounting norms in each country and Datastream’s rating of the most recent data, 2017 and 2018 
were omitted.   
5.1 Accounting Variables  
The three accounting variables that are used in this dissertation are EBIT, SG&A and 
interest expenses. This data is used with two objectives: calibrating k and setting the fixed costs. 
As previously explained, the observed EBIT and EBIT+SG&A figures are not actually used as the 
state variable. Nevertheless, in this subsection we start by analyzing how far the data is from the 
model assumptions. Two of the companies from our sample have limited data because they were 
not publicly traded during the entirety of the period selected or a bankruptcy occurred under the 
company name. In the section 3.1 model, EBIT is assumed to follow a GBM and interest expenses 
are assumed constant. Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics on EBIT. For EBIT to follow a 
GBM, it must have an instantaneous growth rate that is normally distributed. The Shapiro-Wilk 
normality test leads to four rejections at the 0.05 confidence level. However, having only twelve 
observations makes the power of the test low. The average growth rate, controlling for outliers, is 
considerably high at 7.62% (above the US GDP nominal growth rate, which was 3.7%). The 
volatility of EBIT growth is also extremely high, much higher than the volatility of equity for the 
same company. In addition, it is worth noting that average growth and volatility estimates depend 
very significantly on whether one controls for outliers signaling the existence of several outliers. 
The presence of a large number of outliers in a small sample may be corrupting the Shapiro-Wilk 
test results. For example, normality is not rejected in the case of Peugeot and Renault, but these 


































p - values 
Ford Motors Company 12.00 1.70 32.61 -8.75 24.99 0.210 
General Motors Co 7.00 -34.12 132.86 16.41 90.84 0.485 
Toyota Motor Corp 12.00 22.60 43.37 18.24 38.86 0.318 
Hyundai Motor Co 12.00 1.61 39.76 3.27 31.98 0.162 
Kia Motors Co 12.00 16.96 67.56 14.31 36.25 0.019 
Tata Motors Co. 12.00 14.57 34.29 15.25 19.45 0.433 
Honda Motors Co. 12.00 3.37 67.07 15.25 50.17 0.021 
Volkswagen AG 12.00 15.43 169.67 23.47 93.31 0.186 
Daimler AG 12.00 4.58 42.91 9.05 17.47 0.014 
Fiat Chrysler  12.00 6.42 74.86 20.67 69.43 0.462 
Bayerische Motoren 
Werke  12.00 9.30 86.16 
10.95 19.40 0.003 
Renault SA 12.00 -13.47 132.37 -6.16 48.95 0.151 
Peugeot SA  12.00 43.16 147.92 10.75 110.02 0.315 
Volvo AB 12.00 3.04 55.10 -0.48 49.86 0.793 
Tesla INC 288 10.00 - - - - - 
Mitsubishi Motors  12.00 8.98 36.34 8.98 49.47 0.377 
Mahindra LTD 12.00 17.77 21.44 16.15 17.68 0.822 
Sample Average  7.62 74.02 10.46 48.01  
 
The next accounting variable to be verified for consistency is interest expense. The descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 2. From this table, it is possible to see that interest expenses are not 
constant as foreseen by the model. The industry shows a 6% average growth with a volatility that 
is around 35% after controlling for outliers. The fact that some companies present negative interest 
expense growth is understandable given the macro economic trends of the period. The correlation 
with EBIT is on average - 6% for the industry. This is relatively close to zero and thus falls in line 
with the model assumptions. Mahindra and Tata Motors are notable exceptions showing a 

































p - values 
Ford Motors Company 12.00 -4.67 18.23 -4.55 16.51 0.560 
General Motors Co 7.00 -8.32 100.23 -4.95 42.18 0.119 
Toyota Motor Corp 12.00 3.64 32.39 -1.88 23.57 0.079 
Hyundai Motor Co 12.00 -4.05 29.05 -2.64 27.79 0.767 
Kia Motors Co 12.00 2.37 42.14 0.02 42.79 0.801 
Tata Motors Co. 12.00 24.96 29.33 21.72 25.92 0.231 
Honda Motors Co. 12.00 0.56 30.13 2.30 30.35 0.120 
Volkswagen AG 12.00 9.53 16.37 7.42 14.01 0.246 
Daimler AG 12.00 -9.68 50.37 -9.68 64.05 0.514 
Fiat Chrysler  12.00 0.13 28.98 -3.31 28.42 0.626 
Bayerische Motoren 
Werke  12.00 0.70 40.19 1.02 42.66 
0.065 
Renault SA 12.00 4.80 15.65 2.76 12.23 0.028 
Peugeot SA  12.00 -1.20 31.28 -2.50 42.74 0.280 
Volvo AB 12.00 5.37 37.97 1.82 38.57 0.200 
Tesla INC 288 10.00 56.33 223.27 86.06 88.25 0.552 
Mitsubishi Motors  12.00 1.14 70.16 -3.52 27.50 0.030 
Mahindra LTD 12.00 24.55 17.71 24.55 23.85 0.841 
Sample Average   6.25 47.85 6.74 34.79   
 
Moving on to the section 3.2 model, in this case EBIT + SG&A is assumed to follow a GBM and 
interest expenses + SG&A is assumed to remain constant. Table 3 presents the same stats for the 
EBIT+SGA added together. The average growth is only slightly lower than EBIT growth and thus 
far from zero. Adding SG&A to the state variable leads to significantly lower volatility estimates. 
With that said, running the Shapiro-Wilk normality test leads to three companies rejecting the null 
at a 0.05 confidence level (one less than one using the EBIT). This means that adding the SG&A 
to the EBIT yields a variable that is closer to normal distribution than the EBIT alone. The fact that 
growth and volatility estimates obtained controlling for outliers are closer to the values not 































p - values 
Ford Motors Company 12.00 2.76 71.25 -0.24 16.74 0.009 
General Motors Co 7.00 - - 4.59 20.34 0.363 
Toyota Motor Corp 12.00 2.23 33.26 7.02 13.17 0.007 
Hyundai Motor Co 12.00 2.00 17.53 6.53 17.44 0.466 
Kia Motors Co 12.00 6.53 18.91 6.77 11.10 0.722 
Tata Motors Co. 12.00 24.35 38.01 18.05 12.54 0.038 
Honda Motors Co. 12.00 1.82 15.99 2.66 15.81 0.223 
Volkswagen AG 12.00 8.65 31.09 9.14 35.96 0.238 
Daimler AG 12.00 2.30 26.40 1.86 11.53 0.077 
Fiat Chrysler  12.00 4.74 28.54 2.13 19.49 0.223 
Bayerische Motoren Werke  12.00 7.75 21.24 6.11 8.65 0.104 
Renault SA 12.00 0.29 48.25 -3.66 35.44 0.127 
Peugeot SA  12.00 -0.80 37.42 -0.23 30.42 0.542 
Volvo AB 12.00 3.39 34.16 4.38 17.04 0.123 
Tesla INC 288 10.00 - - 54.10 65.80 0.432 
Mitsubishi Motors  12.00 4.28 24.22 5.36 17.50 0.572 
Mahindra LTD 12.00 21.68 16.06 21.68 20.45 0.234 
Sample Average   6.13 30.82 8.60 21.73   
 
SG&A + the interest expense is analyzed in table 4. Similar to Table 3, considering SG&A as a 
fixed costs leads to a lower volatility estimate. This drop in volatility means that this variable is 
more in line with the model assumptions (47.85% to 13.86% on average). The estimated level of 
volatility and the average growth are still far from zero, as assumed in the model. The correlation 
with the state variable of the model is 65%. This is higher than the section 3.1 model making this 
variable weakly aligned with the models assumption. This high level of correlation suggests that 
SG&A still contains expenses that are related to the firm performance and thus are not suitable for 































p - values 
Ford Motors Company 12.00 1.31 25.79 0.74 12.07 0.260 
General Motors Co 7.00 - - 8.47 13.73 0.636 
Toyota Motor Corp 12.00 2.52 10.65 2.79 9.19 1.000 
Hyundai Motor Co 12.00 1.92 16.20 4.30 6.53 0.022 
Kia Motors Co 12.00 6.71 7.59 5.93 7.34 0.923 
Tata Motors Co. 12.00 27.38 28.18 22.86 13.61 0.096 
Honda Motors Co. 12.00 1.21 13.77 3.43 10.47 0.169 
Volkswagen AG 12.00 6.75 11.43 7.57 9.41 0.988 
Daimler AG 12.00 -0.69 12.94 1.81 6.01 0.010 
Fiat Chrysler  12.00 3.13 23.50 -1.56 13.28 0.503 
Bayerische Motoren Werke  12.00 6.54 7.43 5.41 3.57 0.334 
Renault SA 12.00 0.96 7.30 1.07 9.38 0.417 
Peugeot SA  12.00 -2.14 9.02 -2.58 5.45 0.145 
Volvo AB 12.00 3.20 7.76 2.68 6.65 0.700 
Tesla INC 288 10.00 - - 42.49 17.75 0.432 
Mitsubishi Motors  12.00 2.39 7.03 2.23 4.44 0.199 
Mahindra LTD 12.00 25.23 19.27 25.23 28.12 0.067 
Sample Average  5.76 13.86 7.82 10.41   
  
 Additionally, there are also significant issues with the growth of SG&A at Tata Motors, 
Mahindra, and Tesla. There is an increase of over 30% which means that the assumption that the 
fixed costs are fixed does not hold. This combined with the previously mentioned limitations shows 
that the chosen proxy is close but not perfectly aligned with the model’s assumptions. This is a 
potential source for errors. 
5.2 Financial Variables   
This section presents the financial variables used in this dissertation. This consists of 
individual stock equity time series, equity risk premium estimates, interest rates time series and 




Equity value is presented in Appendix-A, having it split by geography shows that the equity 
is closely linked to the geography of the company.  The global industry value dropped significantly 
in 2008 and recovered in 2010. In the US, the recovery of Ford, the IPO of Tesla, and the 
reintroduction of GM to the stock exchange after filing for chapter 11 bankruptcy is a significant 
driver in the industries peak in 2010. In Germany, with the exception of Volkswagen, the car 
manufacturers follow the DAX 30’s growth. However their equity only peaks until 2014. In the 
rest of Europe, the drop in 2008 is observed across all manufacturers. Renault presents the fastest 
recovery although the peak of their recovery is only witnessed in 2014. This implies stronger credit 
worthiness for these manufacturers at that point in time. Looking at the Euro and USD exchange 
rates at the time, the growth in European manufacturers is possibly the result of the US Federal 
Reserve halting their QE and the ECB continuing on their QE programs.  This partially explains 
the different slopes in the European and the American manufacturing charts. This effect is 
neutralized as seen by a flat line in the general industry chart during that period. Relative to each 
other, the default probabilities are expected to be negatively correlated between markets.  
Japan’s economy demonstrates a drop prior to the crisis and remains at crisis levels until it 
starts growing in 2012. From the three players selected, Toyota’s equity value is more correlated 
with non-Japanese trends. In both India and South Korea, the car manufacturers experience steady 
growth in the period after the crisis, a growth that is driving the industry to a stronger post crisis 
level. In comparison with European markets, these two geographies display an upward trend that 
should translate into lower default probabilities in the later stages of the period selected for analysis.    
Section 3 models assume a constant risk-free rate. This is a very stringent assumption and 
thus often ignored in empirical exercises. In this dissertation, the 10-yr US Treasury bill was used 
for companies headquartered in the US, and the equivalent Treasury bond for companies who are 
headquartered elsewhere. The progress of interest per geography is displayed in Figure 1. As 
demonstrated by the averages here, there will be a different minimum required return on companies 






Figure 1: Treasury Interest Rates between 2004-2016 
 
Moreover, in order to calculate the expected return on the project, the CAPM is assumed. The 
equity risk premiums were taken from Aswath Damodaran’s website where he calculates them 
using the current equity prices and risk premiums to return a forward looking estimate. 
(Damadoran, 2017). The CAPM Betas are computed using domicile country market indexes. This 
includes the S&P 500, Nikkei 225, KOSPI, Nifty 500, Dax 30, CAC 40 and, OMXS30 accordingly. 
Below is a list of each company and historical averages of their appropriate index, risk free rate at 

























Table 5 – CAPM Parameter Data  







μe1     
(%)  
Ford Motors Company US S&P 500 4.84 4.22 1.91 9.26 
General Motors Co US S&P 500 4.84 4.27 1.36 6.61 
Toyota Motor Corp Japan Nikkei 225 6.19 1.38 0.97 6.03 
Hyundai Motor Co Korea KOSPI 6.27 4.68 0.88 5.50 
Kia Motors Co Korea KOSPI 6.27 4.75 0.98 6.13 
Tata Motors Co. India NIFTY 500 9.34 6.73 1.27 11.82 
Honda Motors Co. Japan Nikkei 225 6.19 1.41 1.11 6.89 
Volkswagen AG Germany DAX 30 4.84 3.67 1.09 5.28 
Daimler AG Germany DAX 30 4.84 3.71 1.33 6.44 
Fiat Chrysler  Italy FTSE MIB 5.82 3.80 1.24 7.22 
Bayerische Motoren Werke  Germany DAX 30 4.84 3.77 1.09 5.26 
Renault SA France CAC 40 4.84 3.73 1.54 7.43 
Peugeot SA  France CAC 40 4.84 3.75 1.31 6.35 
Volvo AB Sweden OMXS30 4.84 3.71 1.33 6.44 
Tesla INC 288 US S&P 500 4.84 4.48 1.11 5.39 
Mitsubishi Motors  Japan Nikkei 225 6.19 1.31 1.05 6.53 
Mahindra LTD India NIFTY 500 9.34 7.08 1.09 10.19 
1 
Average rates for the selected period  
 
There is a distinct difference between geographies because of their ERP and treasury rates. 
This distinction can also be found in the inferred financial variables as only the Korean and 
Japanese companies have a β below 1. The ERP calculated for the Indian market is the highest due 
to the riskiness of investments in that market. This plays a significant role in computing the return 





This section shows the results of the section 3.1 and 3.2 models applied to our sample 
dataset.  The estimated parameters are analyzed independently and then the model’s intermediary 
outputs are analyzed. Finally, 5-year probabilities of default are estimated and the results are 
compared with the corresponding S&P credit rating implied default probabilities.  
6.1 Parameter Estimates  
6.1.1 Parameter Estimates (section 3.1 model) 
Table 6 shows a break-down of the parameters estimated using the section 3.1 model for 
each of the companies in the sample. Except for General Motors, σv is lower than the historical 
equity volatility. This most likely happens because the estimated project volatility does not take 
into account the leverage of the firm. Except for Volkswagen and Tesla, σv shows a similar value 
across the industry, around 30%. This isn’t the case with the historical volatility of equity, which 
is very heterogeneous across firms. This difference can be the result of different levels of financial 
leverage impacting the project risk. Furthermore, the high standard deviation the market risk is 
shows that the market risk differs highly from company to company. Moreover, as one can expect 
from a mature industry, the k estimates are all positive except for Tesla. This is likely to be the 
result of the company still being in its infancy. The estimated values of k aren’t consistent through 
the industry, though. This shows that companies’ payout rates can be very different despite having 
similar volatility. Conditional on the expected return on the project, a lower k implies a higher 
expected growth on the project value. This may be the case for firms with higher retention for 
research purposes or other expenditures. It may also be evidence that the hypothesis of a constant 









volatility1 σv θ k 
Ford Motors Company 0.515 0.186 0.180 0.039 
General Motors Co 0.294 0.301 0.225 0.007 
Toyota Motor Corp 0.283 0.267 0.213 0.056 
Hyundai Motor Co 0.339 0.271 0.162 0.126 
Kia Motors Co 0.388 0.295 0.158 0.092 
Tata Motors Co. 0.430 0.311 0.275 0.086 
Honda Motors Co. 0.322 0.301 0.214 0.064 
Volkswagen AG 0.474 0.403 0.111 0.122 
Daimler AG 0.365 0.314 0.176 0.081 
Fiat Chrysler  0.531 0.297 0.136 0.083 
Bayerische Motoren Werke  0.318 0.284 0.165 0.097 
Renault SA 0.430 0.313 0.173 0.061 
Peugeot SA  0.465 0.286 0.137 0.011 
Volvo AB 0.352 0.278 0.183 0.060 
Tesla INC 288 0.485 0.458 0.111 -0.012 
Mitsubishi Motors  0.354 0.293 0.184 0.069 
Mahindra LTD 0.381 0.287 0.268 0.066 
Mean  0.396 0.303 0.242 0.065 
Median 0.381 0.295 0.223 0.066 
Std Dev 0.078 0.057 0.092 0.038 
1Volatility has been computed using the log return of market value of equity   
 
Figure 2 shows an x,y plot comparing σv and the standard deviation of the YoY log changes 
of EBIT (see Table 1). Ideally, if the assumptions behind the EBIT payout process hold, the trend 
line should be close to x=y with an origin at (0,0). This is clearly not the case. A positive trend line 
is observed, in part due to two clear outliers. This is likely the result of our empirical standard 
deviation of the log changes of EBIT being not well estimated (short time span). It can be however 







Figure 2: Section 3.1 σv regression against Empirical EBIT volatility 
 
 *Empirical EBIT volatility was computed by fitting a robust linear model that uses M estimators that control for outliers.  
6.1.2 Parameter Estimates (section 3.1 model) 
The estimates for the section 3.2 model are presented in Table 7. σv falls between 15%-20% 
for most companies. Again, the average σv is much lower than the historical volatility of equity. 
The difference is even more pronounced in section 3.2 model than in the section 3.1 model. By 
adding operational leverage to financial leverage, the asset volatility estimates have become lower. 
This outcome is in line with the empirical findings presented in section 5. k estimates are 
approximately 1 p.p. lower in this model.  This implies lower probabilities of default across the 
industry because a lower k, if all else remains the same, would lead to a higher drift and therefore 
a lower default probability. Another interesting change in this model is that Tesla has now a 
positive estimate for k, which is more in line with the model assumptions.   
  


















σv θ k 
Ford Motors Company 0.515 0.227 0.180 0.063 
General Motors Co 0.294 0.158 0.225 0.033 
Toyota Motor Corp 0.283 0.114 0.213 0.032 
Hyundai Motor Co 0.339 0.153 0.162 0.081 
Kia Motors Co 0.388 0.125 0.158 0.062 
Tata Motors Co. 0.430 0.293 0.275 0.108 
Honda Motors Co. 0.322 0.124 0.214 0.034 
Volkswagen AG 0.474 0.186 0.111 0.075 
Daimler AG 0.365 0.128 0.176 0.050 
Fiat Chrysler  0.531 0.207 0.136 0.081 
Bayerische Motoren Werke  0.318 0.115 0.165 0.052 
Renault SA 0.430 0.118 0.173 0.046 
Peugeot SA  0.465 0.108 0.137 0.040 
Volvo AB 0.352 0.108 0.183 0.042 
Tesla INC 288 0.485 0.321 0.111 0.012 
Mitsubishi Motors  0.354 0.105 0.184 0.035 
Mahindra LTD 0.381 0.227 0.268 0.079 
Mean  0.396 0.166 0.181 0.054 
Median 0.381 0.128 0.176 0.050 
Std Dev 0.078 0.067 0.047 0.024 
1Volatility has been computed using the log return of market value of equity   
  
 Figure 3 shows the estimated σv with the standard deviation of their corresponding YoY 
log changes presented in section 5 respectively. Surprisingly, the low R2 shows that our empirical 
estimates are strangely uncorrelated with the volatility estimates that come out from our calibration 
exercise. Again, the short time span of the data and the fact that the log changes of EBIT+SGA 





Figure 3: Section 3.2 σv regression against Empirical EBIT volatility*  
 
*Empirical EBIT volatility was computed by fitting a robust linear model that uses M estimators that control for outliers. 
6.2 Credit Risk Indicators  
6.2.1 Credit Risk Indicators (section 3.1 model)  
Figure 4 (Panel A to E) shows the 5-year probability of default for the period between 2004 
and 2016 based on section 3.1 model. The probabilities of default presented were computed under 
the physical measure. Over the selected period the average default probability was 2.3% peaking 
at 9.04% in early 2009 and dropping to a lowest point of 0.5 % in late 2010.  As expected, an uptick 
in default probability in all geographies is observed starting in 2008. A recovery from this event is 
also shown in most companies. All firms keep their 5-year PDs under 10% except for Volkswagen, 
Peugeot and Fiat. Panel-A shows that three of the four Asian manufacturers were affected by the 
crisis. Mahindra was less affected probably because its revenue streams are less related with U.S. 
and European markets. Panel-B shows how bad the crisis hit the industry in the U.S. with Ford 
breaching the 50% probability during that period. Chrysler and GM probabilities of default are not 
presented as these firms were both spun out into different bankruptcy salvage programs and their 
stock was thus unlisted. European car manufacturers, excluding Germany, show a momentary hike 
in default probabilities during the crisis. They do recover by 2010, but another hike in default 
probabilities occurs for two of the car manufactures.  In contrast to these European players, German 
car producers were among the least affected in 2008. The exception is VW, whose 5-year 
probability of default jumped from close to 0 in the beginning of 2008 to approximately 8% in 















2009. After 2010, the probability of default of VW decreased to around 3%, but it never recovered 
to pre-crisis levels. The probability of default increased again in 2015 following the carbon 
emissions scandal. Japanese firms (Panel E) show extremely low default probabilities during the 
whole period. The only exception is Mitsubishi whose probability of default has a short spike 
during the 2008 crisis. 
 
Figure 4: 5-yr Default Probabilities Split by Geography  
Panel A: 5-yr Default Probabilities Asia (Exc. Japan) 
 
Panel B: 5-yr Default Probabilities USA 
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Panel C: 5-yr Default Probabilities EU (Excluding Germany) 
 












2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015









2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015




Panel E: 5-yr Default Probabilities Japan 
 
When analyzing the probabilities of default, it is important to review some of the intermediary 
components in order to have more insights about the companies’ likelihood of defaulting and the 
sources of these threats. Three important indicators are analyzed in the rest of this section: the 
default barrier to asset ratio, the drift of the process and the distance to distress. The evolution of 
the default barrier to asset value ratio is presented in Exhibit-B for the beginning of each year. 
Under the section 3.1 model, the average ratio for the period is 0.127. This ratio fluctuates across 
time. For example, the average value for 2009 is 0.20. In Exhibit-A, the equity plots show a 
significant decrease in value during that year, which imply a significant drop in asset value.  
Exhibit-C presents the drift of the process each year over the sample period. The drift can 
be computed as the difference between the expected return on the project and the payout rate, k. 
The drift tells us the expected growth rate in project value. In other words, ‘what is the expected 
capital appreciation in the project value?’ In practice, given that the market price of risk, the project 
volatility and k are constant, the changes in the drift reflect the changes in the risk free rate. The 
higher the risk free rate, the higher is the drift, the higher the expected appreciation in the project 
value. The results show that the average drift for our sample period is 0.015. The highest drift rate 
was reached in the beginning of 2011 at 0.025. The industry’s historical average EBIT growth rate 
is significantly higher than the estimated drift. This large difference should be a consequence of 








2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015




seen in the past would lead to a major deleveraging when interest costs are constant. In turn, the 
estimated drift leads to a very slow deleveraging process.  
Exhibit-D shows the distance to default for each of the company. The distance to default 
tells how many standard deviations the current asset value is away from the default barrier. This 
means that the metric incorporates asset value, default barrier, and volatility into one single metric. 
The Japanese market leads the chart consistently. The smallest distances, and therefore the weakest 
indicator, is found for Ford and Fiat.  
6.2.2 Credit Risk Indicators (section 3.2 model) 
Figure 5 displays the results from the section 3.2 model. They show that the average 5-year 
probabilities move up by 1309 b.p. to 15.47%. The differences between the companies remain 
relatively similar, though. In contrast with the section 3.1 model, no firm stays close to a zero 
chance of defaulting under this model. Most of the industry is hovering between 10%-20%, hence 
showing weaker credit worthiness. The effects of the financial crisis are dissipating more 
significantly across the panels, although some European companies don’t recover and maintain 
their default probability closer to the crisis levels. The Japanese manufacturers are again displaying 
the strongest credit worthiness. In the rest of Asia, the default probabilities during the build-up to 
the crisis are more volatile, but most players recover to default probabilities below 10%.  
The barrier to asset ratio gives an important insight into understanding the increase in 
default probabilities. The industry average value through-out the period rises from 0.127 in section 
3.1 model to 0.525 which is significantly higher. Having added a claimant to the project value, it 
inherently increased the default probability across the sample. By limiting companies’ flexibility 
in the face of cyclicality this way, they become more vulnerable to default. This means that the 
EBIT margins that make the industry display strong credit worthiness in the section 3.1 model is 
dissolved into the operational costs before reaching the claimants on the companies payoffs. The 
average drift factor for the selected companies for the sample period is 0.005, much smaller than 
the average EBIT growth and section 3.1 model estimate. Although positive, this means that there 
isn’t much prospect for significant growth in the asset value. This also contributes to higher default 
probabilities and shows that when the return on asset isn’t strong enough, it leads to higher default 
probabilities in the 3.2 model. The distance to default is consistent with this finding as the average 




  In the cross-section it is interesting that some reputable companies show signs of weak 
creditworthiness. The three companies that stand out are European. Peugeot does not show signs 
of recovery after the crisis with its probability of default remaining consistently around 50% until 
2013. Peugeot recorded negative EBITs several times during this period, its equity dropped and its 
SG&A and interest expense remained constant. As a result, its average distance to default stayed 
below 1. Volkswagen shows a very similar path. Looking at its yearly data, SG&A and interest 
expense remained constant during that period but EBIT was very volatile.  Fiat recovers from the 
crisis, but an important hike in probabilities in 2010 puts it at above average rates. Comparing these 
three key players of the industry, and looking at the model independently, Fiat is the weakest of 
the three despite having a Moody’s rating of Baa1. Moreover, Peugeot is rated Baa3 and looks to 
be less risky than Volkswagen who’s rated at A3. This could be evidence that the model is inflating 
these numbers, or the inputs are not strong enough (Frey 2019). 
 
Figure 5: 5-yr Default probabilities split by geography 
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Panel B: 5-yr Default Probabilities USA 
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Panel D: 5-yr Default Probabilities Germany 
 
Panel E: 5-yr Default Probabilities Japan  
  
6.4 Results Comparison With Credit Rating Implied Default 
Probabilities   
The default probabilities computed by both models are different, and this section aims to 
find a point of reference to better understand them. All the companies have had fluctuating credit 
ratings over the selected time period. The S&P Rating of each company was chosen as the credit 
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the S&P Global Fixed Income Research’s data from their 2017 annual global corporate default 
study and rating transitions report. Exhibit-E shows the implied default probability of each 
company at the end of each year during the selected time frame. The average default probability 
using this methodology is 3.42% for the automotive industry. This is slightly higher than the 
outcome of the section 3.1 model but significantly lower than the section 3.2 model. This 
comparison shows that there are improvements to make to the later model as SG&A is not the 
perfect proxy to use for operating leverage in this situation.  
 
 







The goal of this thesis is to evaluate the probabilities of default of 17 firms in the automotive 
industry using the static version of the Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001) structural model. Two cases 
were analyzed, where EBIT and EBIT+SGA were chosen, respectively, as the observable proxies 
for the project payout. The observable proxies for fixed costs were interest expenses in the first 
case (as in Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001)) and interest expenses plus SG&A in the second case 
(as in Eisdorfer, Goyal and Zhdanov (2019)). The models were calibrated adapting the Vassalou 
and Xing (2004) algorithm proposed for the Merton model. Some limitations to consider while 
analyzing the results is that the input variables aren’t fully reflecting the GBM assumption made 
by the GJL Framework for aforementioned reasons.     
The model proposed in section 3.1 leads to an average default probability of 2.38%. This is 
far lower than the section 3.2 model, which leads to an average default probability of 15.47%. This 
significant difference coupled with a high correlation between the state variable and the fixed costs 
proxy suggests that we are probably overestimating fixed costs. This leads to the main conclusion 
of this dissertation. Despite adding SG&A as a proxy for fixed costs to turn the model more in line 
with the data, a better proxy for fixed costs must be found in order to avoid overshooting the 
probability of default. Using only labor costs instead of the SG&A could be a good alternative.  
Though the models lead to very different average probabilities of default, they have a 
similar pattern, with the main macro-economic events, such as the financial crisis and the European 
debt crisis, being clearly identifiable in the probabilities of default. By geography, it is clear that 
Japanese-based companies demonstrate stronger creditworthiness regardless of the model. The US 
manufacturers that survived the crisis have recovered to the industry average but the financial crisis 
was a terminal event for some industry champions. In Europe, surprisingly enough, Volkswagen 
demonstrates a consistently higher than average default probability even prior to the spike in 2015 
that resulted from the carbon emission scandal. Some other European manufacturers displayed 
weak signs of recovery that were even accentuated under the section 3.2 model. 
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1Data collected from the S&P Global Fixed Income Research 2017 annual global corporate default study and rating transitions report 
 
  
Company Name 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Ford Motors Company 3,86 17,89 17,89 26,18 46,22 14,53 3,86 3,86 2,84 2,84 2,84 2,84
General Motors Co - - - - - 9,66 3,86 3,86 3,86 2,84 2,84 2,84
Toyota Motor Corp 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,16 0,16 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33
Hyundai Motor Co 2,84 2,84 2,84 2,84 2,84 1,42 1,42 1,03 1,03 1,03 0,57 0,57
Kia Motors Co 3,86 2,84 2,84 2,84 2,84 1,42 1,42 1,03 1,03 1,03 0,57 0,57
Tata Motors Co. 6,52 3,86 3,86 6,52 17,89 9,66 9,66 6,52 6,52 6,52 6,52 3,86
Honda Motors Co. 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45
Volkswagen AG 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,49 0,57 1,03
Daimler AG 1,42 1,42 1,03 0,57 1,03 1,03 1,03 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,49
Fiat Chrysler 9,66 9,66 6,52 6,52 3,86 3,86 6,52 6,52 6,52 9,66 6,52 3,86
Bayerische Motoren Werke 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,49 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,49 0,49 0,45 0,45 0,45
Renault SA 1,03 1,03 1,03 1,42 6,52 3,86 3,86 3,86 3,86 3,86 2,84 2,84
Peugeot SA 1,03 1,03 1,03 1,03 3,86 3,86 3,86 6,52 9,66 14,53 9,66 6,52
Volvo AB 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,57 1,42 2,84 1,42 1,42 1,42 1,42 1,42 1,03
Tesla INC 288 - - - - - - - - - 26,18 26,18 26,18
Mitsubishi Motors 0,57 0,49 0,49 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,45 0,49
Mahindra and Mahindra LTD 2,84 2,84 2,84 2,84 2,84 2,84 2,84 2,84 2,84 2,84 2,84 2,84
2,40 3,09 2,85 3,58 6,10 3,57 2,63 2,52 2,65 4,44 3,86 3,36







#GJL Model as functions  
 
rm(list=ls())   
 
x_function <- function(rf, k, sig_a) { 
  miu <- rf-k  
  a <- sig_a^2/2 
  b <- 2*rf*sig_a^2 
   
  c <- (miu-a)^2 
  d <- miu-a 
  e <- d+sqrt(c+b) 
  x <- e/sig_a^2  
  return(x) 
} 
 
y_function <- function(rf, k, sig_a) { 
  miu <- rf-k 
  a <- sig_a^2/2 
  b <- 2*rf*sig_a^2 
   
  c <- (miu-a)^2 
  d <- miu-a 
  e <- d-sqrt(c+b) 
  y <- e/sig_a^2  






#Default Barrier Function  
v_b_function <- function( rf, k, sig_a, C) { 
  l_d <- x_function(rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a) / (x_function(rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a)+1) 
  V_b <- l_d*C*(1/rf) 




p_b_function <- function( v_a, rf, k, sig_a, C){ 
  R<- v_a/v_b_function(rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C) 
  p_b <- R^(-1*x_function(rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a)) 
  #return ((R>1)*p_b+(R<=1)*10^10) 
  return (p_b) 
} 
 
v_int_function <- function( v_a, rf, k, sig_a, C ){ 
  v_int <- (1-p_b_function( v_a=v_a, rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C ))*C/rf  
  return(v_int) 
} 
 
v_solv_function <- function(v_a, rf, k, sig_a, C){ 
  v_solv <- v_a - v_b_function( rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C )*p_b_function( v_a=v_a, rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C)  
  return(v_solv) 
} 
 
e_function <- function( v_a, rf, k, sig_a, C, TaxCorp, TaxDiv){ 








#Finding sigma and k 
 
FindV <- function(x, k, sig_a, TimeM) { 
  ModelEquity<-e_function(v_a=x, rf=RF[TimeM], k=k, sig_a, C=Intexp[TimeM], TaxCorp=0.2, TaxDiv=0.2) 
  #print(ModelEquity) 
  return(Equity[TimeM]-(ModelEquity>0 & ModelEquity<x)*ModelEquity) 
} 
 
Vfunction <- function(k, sig_a, TimeM){ 
uniroot(f=FindV, interval=c(v_b_function(rf=RF[TimeM],k=k,sig_a=sig_a,C=Intexp[TimeM])+20,10^10),extendInt = "yes", sig_a, 
k, TimeM)$root 
} 
#Finds the project value that matches equity value 
Vfunction <- function(k, sig_a){ 




FindAssetVol <- function (k, Start_sig_a) { 
  Error <- 10^10 
  while (Error > 0.00001){ 
    RecoveryAssetVec_1 <- Vfunction(k, sig_a=Start_sig_a) 
    log_ret <- diff(log(RecoveryAssetVec_1),lag=1) 
    sig_a1 <-  sd(log_ret)*sqrt(52)  




    Start_sig_a <- sig_a1 
  } 
  return(sig_a1) 
} 
 
# Find K  
Findk<- function(Start_k, sig_a){ 
  Error <- 10^10 
  for (i in 1:627) 
    while (Error>0.00001){ 
      RecoveryAssetVec_1 <- Vfunction(k=Start_k, sig_a) 
      k_a1 <- sum(EBIT[1:627])/sum(RecoveryAssetVec_1) 
      Error<- abs(Start_k-k_a1)  
      Start_k <- k_a1 
    } 
  return(k_a1) 
  return(RecoveryAssetVec_1) 
} 
 
#Reiterate the FindAssetVol and Findk together 
FindK_Sig <- function(Start_k, Start_sig_a){ 
  sig_a <- FindAssetVol(k=Start_k, Start_sig_a=Start_sig_a)  
  print(sig_a) 
  ke <- Findk(Start_k=Start_k, sig_a=sig_a) 
  print(ke) 
  sig_a <- FindAssetVol(k=ke, Start_sig_a=sig_a)  
  print(sig_a) 
  ke <- Findk(Start_k=ke, sig_a=sig_a) 




  return(c(sig_a, ke)) 
} 
 
Sig_k <- FindK_Sig(Start_k=0.05,Start_sig_a=0.2) 
 
sig_a <- Sig_k[1] 
k     <- Sig_k[2] 
 
# Step 3 
# miu_A estimation  
 
ERP   <- Data[1,11] 
Beta  <- Data[1,12] 
miu_e <- RF+Beta*(ERP) 
 
# Sigma as standard deviation of log returns  
Findmiu_a <- function(Beta, ERP, sig_a){ 
  log_ret_e <- diff(log(Equity[1:627])) 
  sigma_e   <- sd(log_ret_e)*sqrt(52) 
  Mk_Rsk    <- Beta*ERP/sigma_e 
  miu_a     <- RF+Mk_Rsk*sig_a 
  return(miu_a) 
} 
miu_a <- Findmiu_a(Beta, ERP, sig_a) 
 
#Step 4  
#Probability of default function  
 





for(i in 1:627){  
  Barrier[i]<-v_b_function(rf=RF[i], k, sig_a, C=Intexp[i]) 
} 
V_b_Ratio <- Barrier / RecoveryAssetVec_1 
max(Barrier/RecoveryAssetVec_1) 
 
# Time Series of PDs  
D2D<-function(k, sig_a, miu_a, years, Time){ 
  Delta_t <- 1/52 
  TimeT   <- 52*years  
  a <- (miu_a - k - (sig_a^2/2)) 
  b <- TimeT*Delta_t 
  c <- log(RecoveryAssetVec_1[Time]/v_b_function(rf=RF[Time], k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=Intexp[Time])) 
  d <- sig_a*sqrt(b) 
  e<- (c+a*b)/d 
} 
 
AuxProbability<-function(k, sig_a, miu_a, years, Time){  
  pnorm(-D2D(k, sig_a, miu_a, years, Time)) 
} 
 
PDfunc <- function(k, sig_a, miu_a, years, Time) 
{  
  Delta_t <- 1/52 
  TimeT   <- 52*years  
  a <- (miu_a - k - (sig_a^2/2)) 
  b <- TimeT*Delta_t 




  d <- sig_a*sqrt(b) 
   
  e <- pnorm(((a*b)-c)/d) 
  f <- exp((2/sig_a^2)*a*c)*pnorm(((a*b)+c)/d) 
   
  g <- e-f 
   




for(i in 1:627){ 
  D2D_Series[i]<-D2D(k, sig_a, miu_a=miu_a[i], years=5,Time=i) 
  PD_Series_aux1[i]<-AuxProbability(k, sig_a, miu_a[i], years=5,Time=i) 
  PD_Series[i] <- PDfunc( k, sig_a, miu_a[i], years=5, Time =i ) 
} 
 
 
